المكوّنات مزدوجة الاستخدام ذات المنشأ الصيني في سلاسل الإمداد إلى الحوثيين: حدود إنفاذ حظر السلاح الأممي، وما تكشفه ضبطيات 2024–2026

<jats:p>This report examines the role of Chinese-origin dual-use components in supply chains linked to the Houthi movement in Yemen, with a focus on the limits of enforcing the United Nations arms embargo and the implications of seizures recorded between 2024 and 2026. It analyzes the shift from smuggling complete military systems toward more complex procurement networks relying on commercial components, dual-use technologies, chemical precursors, navigation systems, fuel cells, and other items that can support local assembly of drones, missiles, and related systems. The report distinguishes between the Chinese state, private companies, and the broader commercial market, noting that available evidence points to the presence of China-based companies and components in procurement chains without proving an official Chinese government policy to arm the Houthis. It also assesses maritime and overland transit routes, enforcement gaps, sanctions limitations, end-user verification weaknesses, and the need for faster coordination between technical tracing, regulatory action, customs control, and international monitoring mechanisms.</jats:p>