Abstract
<jats:p>This policy brief examines the emerging structure of U.S.–China competition under networked warfare. It argues that competition is becoming functional as well as geographic: the United States and China can shape the same cross-theater conflict environment without acting as opposing belligerents in the same war. The brief distinguishes two forms of functional centrality. The United States operates primarily as an operational-control center, organizing high-end military action through alliances, intelligence, bases, logistics, targeting networks, and cross-theater allocation. China functions increasingly as a systemic-connectivity node, shaping how production, trade, energy, logistics, and diplomatic access adjust to disruption across actors that do not form a coherent bloc. The brief concludes that long-war advantage will depend on the ability to combine high-end operational control with sustainable production, repair, rerouting, recovery, and systemic adaptability.</jats:p>