Feasibility Analysis of the Acceptance of Punitive Damages in the Iranian Civil Liability System with Emphasis on the Deterrent Function

<jats:p>Civil liability in traditional Iranian law has predominantly been grounded in a compensatory function, and its primary objective has been regarded as restoring the injured party to the status quo ante. However, contemporary social and economic developments indicate that mere compensation for damage—particularly in cases involving intentional harmful conduct, profit-driven wrongdoing, or gross negligence—does not possess sufficient effectiveness in preventing and correcting harmful behaviors. Under such circumstances, the fundamental question arises as to whether the institution of “punitive damages” may be employed as a complementary instrument within the Iranian civil liability system and whether such an institution is compatible with the legal foundations and jurisprudential principles governing Iranian law. The present article, adopting a descriptive–analytical methodology and employing a comparative jurisprudential–legal approach, examines the nature of punitive damages and their deterrent function, and analyzes the feasibility of recognizing this institution within the framework of the Iranian civil liability system. The findings of the research demonstrate that although punitive damages appear, at first glance, to extend beyond the scope of compensatory reparation, reliance on their deterrent and preventive functions allows for their justification in light of certain jurisprudential principles, including the rule of no harm (lā ḍarar), the prohibition of abuse of rights, and the doctrinal foundations of financial taʿzīr (discretionary monetary sanctions). The study concludes that the acceptance of punitive damages in Iranian law—provided that their application is limited, regulated, and confined to specific instances such as intentional or gross fault and harm to public interests—not only does not conflict with jurisprudential principles and the foundations of civil liability, but may also contribute to strengthening the deterrent function and enhancing the overall efficiency of the legal system.</jats:p>