Abstract
<p>While politicians commonly employ anticorruption appeals, the effectiveness of such appeals varies considerably. I argue that anticorruption appeals carry signals of authenticity and examine how voters use information on the context of corruption, the messenger, and the content of the policy in their evaluations. Drawing on two original survey experiments in Colombia and Mexico, I show that voters rely on these features to evaluate anticorruption action by politicians. Evaluations are more favorable in the absence of a recent corruption scandal, when the proposer is an opposition politician, and when the policy emphasizes punitiveness. However, political loyalties can dampen the effect of opposition membership. Remarkably, governing party legislators are rewarded for punitive action whereas opposition legislators are not---an effect that is strongest among respondents who did not support the incumbent president. These findings offer new insights into how voters evaluate the credibility of anticorruption appeals, showing how such appeals can boost electoral outcomes regardless of politicians’ intentions to follow through.</p>