Abstract
<p>In many respects, Argentina is an antithetic case of fiscal federalism. Challenging established theses on the benefits of decentralized revenue responsibilities, it has unrelentingly grown into a textbook case of fiscal governance predicated on central government´s dominance. While significant research efforts were undertaken to decipher the roots of the resulting increase of fiscal centralization, there is a shortage of analyses exploring the role of municipal governments in such theoretical puzzle. This chapter seeks to rectify such omission, underscoring the paramount function of municipal governments as grassroots carriers of federal fiscal governance. It begins with a discussion of the theoretical state-of-the-art on local politics in federalism studies, in general, and Argentina, in particular. Next, we take a snapshot at the demographic and economic data of local governments and municipal regimes in Argentina, identifying their historical and structural underpinnings. Third, we turn our attention to the evolution and consequences of local fiscal empowerment since the 1994 Constitutional Reform. Fourth, it examines the effects and results of local governance in decisive policy areas to assess the extent to which it can be considered a critical missing link of nation-provinces relationships. In closing, we claim that despite significant strides were accomplished in advancing political decentralization in the wake of the 1994 Constitutional Reform, deepening national, provincial, and municipal triadic fiscal relations stands out as a pending assignment for further consolidating federal rule in the country.</p>