Abstract
<p>A century from now, the computational framework at the center of psychology will no longer organize the discipline. As used here, "computational" names a broad information-processing ontology: meaning is specified in advance, rather than generated through the activity, history, and situation of living beings. This assumption fits engineered systems, but it misdescribes living ones. This article argues that three converging shifts are destabilizing that framework. The first undermines the computational account of inheritance: organisms develop through activity within configurations of constraints reconstituted across generations, not through the readout of genetic programs. The second displaces its account of psychological structure: psychological phenomena unfold as trajectories of coordination rather than as stable traits, with reliability and variability arising from the same generative process. The third sharpens the first two: artificial intelligence systems produce fluent performance without embodiment, developmental history, or any stake in the world. This contrast reveals what living organization contributes. The psychology implied by these shifts treats development as foundational, not as a subfield. It understands psychological constructs as patterns of activity that persons sustain over time, and is better positioned to address a century of changing human ecologies. This future psychology will be a developmental science of living sense-making.</p>