Abstract
<p>Why do governments prevent crime in some places while neglecting others? Crime prevention policies are often viewed as too slow, diffuse, and politically intangible to generate electoral rewards. When implemented, existing research suggests they primarily serve to reward co-partisans or mobilize ideologically aligned voters. This article challenges that view by arguing that incumbents allocate crime-prevention resources to electorally competitive municipalities because these investments yield electoral returns. Using detailed project-level data from Colombia, I show that national incumbents disproportionately direct crime-prevention funds to municipalities where recent presidential elections were closely contested, rather than to areas with higher crime rates or strong partisan loyalties. I then demonstrate that these allocations increase the vote share of the right-wing incumbent coalition in subsequent elections. Drawing on quantitative analyses and interviews with policymakers and bureaucrats, I argue that these effects operate primarily through the visibility and attribution of crime prevention projects, particularly those aligned with right-wing issue ownership of public security.</p>