Abstract
<p>This paper argues that comparative legal reasoning fails when foreign law is treated as a detachable example, exotic contrast, or ready-made borrowing for the home legal system. Successful comparison is instead a disciplined encounter between cognitive matrices: the categories through which the comparatist sees, the self-understandings through which the foreign legal order reasons, and the institutional, linguistic, and living-law conditions that give legal materials their force. The argument proceeds in six steps. First, it argues that comparison must subserve edification by exposing the home matrix, so that foreign law can teach rather than be flattened by unexamined domestic categories. Second, it argues that what can travel is not a rule-fragment but a legal reason whose route, speaker, authority, medium, and uptake must be reconstructed. Third, it treats global legal language as the hard case, because terms such as rights, rule of law, governance, dignity, or constitutionalism may circulate widely while silencing the local conditions that make law operative. Fourth, it defends thin borrowing as legitimate only when the claim is graded, bounded, reversible, and kept distinct from thick reconstruction. Fifth, it explains how comparison can expose the home matrix without mastering the foreign one, by preserving alien intelligibility while allowing foreign friction to reconfigure domestic assumptions. Sixth, it translates the account into a proportional protocol: claim discipline asks what work the foreign material is doing; source discipline tracks its route, carrier, authority, translation, and medium; interpretive discipline returns it to legal activity; and normative discipline asks whether its use preserves intelligibility or risks domination, exoticization, or misuse. Comparative reasoning becomes legally judicious when it lets an alien matrix discipline the home argument without allowing the home matrix to seize, flatten, or speak in the other's name.</p>