Abstract
<jats:p>In the governance of large organizations, there often exists a significant divergence between formal authority structures and actual patterns of control. This paper proposes the theoretical framework of "Interface Governance," arguing that non-decision-makers who occupy key organizational interfacesinformation interfaces, procedural interfaces, and coordination interfaces-can gain actual control as a structural by-product, independent of personal intent over organizations through three structural mechanisms: information filtering, institutional inertia, and social networks. "Gatekeeper Governance" is a typical manifestation of Interface Governance. Through a comparative analysis of three cases-British Permanent Secretaries, Qing Dynasty yamen secretaries, and modern corporate COO succession-this paper reveals the structural inevitability of informal control: gatekeepers need not possess any intention to control; their organizational position itself constitutes a source of power. The paper further explores the transformation of gatekeeper roles in the digital algorithmic era, from human gatekeepers to algorithmic gatekeepers, and its implications for organizational governance.</jats:p>