Abstract
<title>Abstract</title> <p>Achieving credible carbon disclosure in multi-tier supply chains is persistently hindered by information asymmetry and the resulting “carbon trust deficit”. This study investigates the dynamic transition from coercive regulation to an autonomous, market-based governance regime using a four-player evolutionary game theoretical framework involving a government regulator, a focal firm, a third-party certifier, and an upstream supplier. By endogenizing the credibility of carbon information, we model how regulatory penalties, green premiums, and reputational mechanisms jointly shape the evolution of carbon trust under replicator dynamics. The analytical and numerical results reveal that the system can endogenously converge to an “Autonomous Carbon Trust Equilibrium”, where the government retreats to a supportive role. We identify the focal firm’s strategic trust repair as a key catalyst that initiates this transition. Furthermore, we uncover a critical threshold effect in the reputation mechanism, demonstrating that market discipline can effectively substitute for administrative penalties once reputational losses exceed a specific tipping point. These findings provide a dynamic explanation of when and how governance can shift from front-line enforcement to market-disciplined self-enforcement, and suggest that policy should prioritize activating market catalysts and optimizing verification infrastructure to support this transition.</p>