Guardianship Inversion and Enforcement Asymmetry: The US‑Iran Conflict in Comparative Perspective

<title>Abstract</title> <p>Why do institutions created to restrain war become least effective when their privileged guardians enter conflict? The analysis develops guardianship inversion, a role-conflict mechanism in which a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council becomes a belligerent, strategic patron, or political protector while retaining influence over collective judgement. The argument links institutionalized enmity to enforcement asymmetry. Durable threat narratives generate expansive security claims; privileged position filters their assessment; selective or fragmented enforcement permits escalation; and escalation reproduces enmity. A theory-building process trace follows the erosion of the 2015 nuclear agreement and the 2025–2026 US-Iran conflict using United Nations records, Article 51 notifications, International Atomic Energy Agency reports, International Maritime Organization materials, and official state documents. Comparative probes drawn from Ukraine, the Falklands or Malvinas, and the Sahel assess portability and boundary conditions. The evidence shows that dense legal rules do not disappear during conflict. Unequal access, evidentiary control, veto privilege, and fragmented jurisdiction instead weaken reciprocal restraint. The contribution is a social-scientific account of how role conflict inside international institutions converts formal guardianship into privileged belligerency. The findings support conflict-of-interest abstention, public veto justification, independent assessment of self-defence claims, and continuity protocols for international monitoring.</p>