Abstract
<title>Abstract</title> <p> The conventional view of central bank credibility assumes that persistent deviations from inflation targets eventually lead to a near-complete collapse of credibility. This study re-examines this proposition in the context of economies where monetary policy priorities shift under political dominance, using Türkiye as a case study. First, the evolution of central bank credibility is analysed using a multidimensional framework that combines target-based measures, expectation pass-through, dynamic anchoring, forecast uncertainty, and probability-based distributional indicators. The findings show that, although credibility deteriorated substantially, it did not disappear. While inflation expectations drifted away from official targets, they did not become completely detached from central bank communication, remaining systematically bounded within a predictable range. In the second stage, these findings are interpreted within a framework of political dominance, in which the de facto objectives of monetary policy are reweighted from price stability toward growth and employment. The study argues that, under such conditions, central bank credibility may persist not as an inflation-targeting anchor but as a credibility floor that reflects the predictability and internal consistency of the policy regime. In doing so, the paper offers a new conceptual perspective on monetary policy credibility. <bold>JEL Codes:</bold> E52, E58, E61 </p>