Abstract
<title>Abstract</title> <p>Why does hedging erode even when smaller states manage it strategically? This study explores whether and how Vietnam's hedging remains viable when confronting coercive asymmetry and jurisdictional contestation in polarized regional orders. Adopting a qualitative case-study design, the analysis draws on secondary sources, complemented by six structured expert interviews, and proceeds through documentary review and interpretive triangulation. It argues that hedging erosion is not simply a product of accumulating great-power pressure, but of a structurally embedded feedback loop wherein defensive measures generate threat perceptions that activate coercive responses and compress positional ambiguity. Furthermore, operational constraints can precede domestic mediation, rendering assertive hedging materially infeasible regardless of political will. In advancing a mechanism-based account of small-state hedging erosion, the article reframes hedging not as a stable equilibrium contingent on domestic political calculation, but as a condition perpetually vulnerable to the escalatory logic it seeks to contain. This reframing carries direct implications for Indo-Pacific security: as ambiguity-based strategies lose viability under sustained coercive pressure, smaller states such as Vietnam may face narrowing space for flexible positioning and growing pressure toward doctrinal adjustment or de facto alignment, raising questions about the durability of hedging as a stabilizing feature of the regional order.</p>