Reasoning Attention under Evidential Underdetermination

<title>Abstract</title> <p>Attention has primarily been studied in relation to perception, salience, and action, while its role in reasoning has received comparatively little attention. This paper argues that attention also performs an epistemic function within inference by organizing the evidential salience of competing considerations. To capture this function, I introduce the concept of reasoning attention and distinguish three forms of attentional organization: Type A, Type B, and Type C. Type A involves defective or non-truth-directed inference. Type B remains rational but operates under evidential underdetermination, where competing explanations remain compatible with the available evidence. Type C emerges only when decisive evidence establishes an exclusive inferential structure. I argue that severe evidential underdetermination prevents the stable realization of Type C reasoning attention because decisive evidence may be absent, fabricated, or subsequently defeated. The argument is developed through contemporary theories of attention, detective-style cases, and a novel Werewolf thought experiment. The paper contributes to debates in attention theory and epistemology by proposing a new framework for understanding how attention structures evidential organization within reasoning.</p>