Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>In 1914, the actions of German political and military decision-makers depended not merely on the machinery of the government, army, and navy but also on the public’s attitudes to the military, military service, and ‘militarism’. No German leader could ignore the complicated responses and coalitions of political parties and their electorates required to wage war. The likelihood of revolution and the willingness of citizens to put up with economic dislocation and to bear the burden of human suffering—or the catastrophic effects of war—rested on public opinion, which in turn derived from their experiences and memories of the wars of unification, their political support for and opposition to the army and navy, and their contact with the military as conscripts and volunteers, or as relatives of soldiers and veterans. The lessons of foreign wars, the evaluation of enemies, and the imagination of ‘wars of the future’ also played a part. How and why did German leaders help to bring about the First World War which so many observers had predicted might turn into a disaster? This study reassesses the military and diplomatic history of the German Empire before 1914.</jats:p>