Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This book applies natural kinds to the science of perception. The book makes the case that natural kinds are important both for the philosophy of perception and for perceptual psychology itself.</jats:p> <jats:p>The book explores the division of the visual system into the ‘ventral’ and ‘dorsal’ streams. It argues that each of these streams is a natural kind, but that visual episodes as a whole are not a natural kind. On this view, visual episodes should not be seen as a single, unified category, but rather as a loose collection of different things, lacking in unifying features.</jats:p> <jats:p>One of the book’s other central case studies is working memory. It argues that working memory is a natural kind, and that the natural kindhood of working memory can shed new light on the long-standing debate concerning how working memory relates to consciousness.</jats:p> <jats:p>The book also applies natural kinds to consciousness in early life. It argues that natural kinds can help us answer the question of when consciousness emerges in infancy. It uses the machinery of natural kinds to outline and defend a methodology for ascertaining when consciousness emerges in babies and infants.</jats:p> <jats:p>Finally, the book examines the relevance of natural kinds to the methodology of psychology, defending the surprising claim that if a psychological concept fails to refer to a natural kind, then that concept ought to be eliminated from psychology.</jats:p>