Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Although the Kantian approach to the foundations of ethics is a significant and attractive one, it is rarely laid out in a way that suffices to makes its appeal visible to those who are not already immersed in it. The goal of this essay is primarily expository: to say enough to make it clear why Kantianism is worth taking seriously—even by those who may, at the end of the day, choose not to accept it. But there is a secondary goal as well. While Kant himself believed that Kantian foundations support a deontological rather than a consequentialist normative theory, and while most philosophers have assumed that he was right about this claim, the essay argues that it is in fact far from clear whether this is actually the case. So it also offers an account of Kantianism that consequentialists themselves may find congenial. At the very least, if it is true that Kantian foundations are fairly plausible, then it behooves those who want to reject those foundations to understand them well enough to identify exactly where they think those foundations go wrong.</jats:p>