Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Some norms for making judgements require a thinker to be sensitive to factive states. They include norms for making perceptual judgements; judgements based on action-awareness; judgements suitably sensitive to tacit knowledge; and norms for making deductive inferences. An account of such norms should be embedded in a treatment that recognizes objective, that is, mind-independent, justificational structures. The treatment aims to steer a middle course between pure reliabilist treatments of justification and knowledge, and pure internalist accounts. It treats seeming-justification as explanatorily dependent upon genuine justification. When a thinker makes a justified judgement, there is some objective structure of contents and states such that the thinker is justified in virtue of their relations to that structure. The source of the objective norms that involve factive states can be traced back to the thinker’s aim of truth, inter alia, in judgement, together with the fundamental reference rules for the concepts in the content of the judgement in question. The emerging position is a species of rationalism that can explain certain internalist intuitions while not endorsing internalism. It also rejects fundamentalism about reasons. The position is compared with those of McDowell, Scanlon, and Williamson.</jats:p>