Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>The core idea of A Relational Theory of Justice is that normative economic, political, and legal philosophy should be grounded on people’s relational features, in particular their ability to commune with others and be communed with by them. Usually, philosophers of justice in the West have based their views on people’s intrinsic features, ones that make no essential reference to others, such as their well-being, autonomy, or self-ownership. In addition, often critics of basing institutional choice on justice, whether in the African, feminist/care, Marxian, or Confucian traditions, have appealed to non-intrinsic values as leverage, roughly contending that relationships are more important than justice. In contrast to both camps, this book articulates and defends accounts of justice based on the dignity of people’s relational nature. A proper valuation of people’s capacity to be party to communal relationships does not transcend categories of justice but instead calls for sorts that differ in plausible ways from those grounded on intrinsic properties. Applications are discussed in the contexts of distributive, compensatory, criminal, transitional, and global justice. Together they are intended to constitute an appealing big picture of communal governance that rivals the grand comprehensive philosophies of, for example, utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, Lockean natural rights theory, and the capabilities approach.</jats:p>