Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>Undoubtedly, the testimony of scientific experts carries significant epistemic weight. But how exactly does it normatively constrain the belief formation of laypeople? This book argues that expert testimony holds epistemic authority over laypeople in a way that partly preempts their critical reasoning from being rationally usable in belief formation. This Preemption View of epistemic authority, shaped by philosophers such as Joseph Raz, Arnon Keren, and Linda Zagzebski, has yet to receive a thorough epistemological explanation, a compelling motivation, or a robust defense against challenges—all of which this book aims to provide. Preemptive reasons are explored through the framework of higher-order defeat, with a novel argument demonstrating how expert testimony generates these higher-order defeaters. Because these defeaters are themselves defeasible and of limited scope, the book systematically addresses and overcomes the ten most significant objections to the Preemption View. The emerging view explains how laypeople’s deference to experts is properly linked to their thinking for themselves and what remains of their epistemic autonomy. Additionally, the book offers a short history of epistemic authority and applies its theoretical insights to real-world phenomena.</jats:p>