Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This book argues that there are four different justifications that a liberal state can appeal to in order to justify imposing targeted restrictions on the liberty of individuals: (1) deserved punishment, (2) forfeiture of rights, (3) enforceable duties to self-restrict, and (4) lack of accountability. The classic justification for the criminal law—that those who culpably commit serious public wrongs deserve punishment that is proportional to their culpable wrongdoing—should be complemented by a different justification—fair forfeiture of the right not to suffer a serious penalty—that would justify a related but distinct kind of law, which I call penal law. In addition, while punishments and penalties can be used to incapacitate dangerous people, incapacitation cannot be a defining aim of either kind of law. It can be at most a secondary benefit of those practices. Nonetheless, lawbreaking actions can ground forfeiture of the presumption of law abidingness, and as a result, it may then be fair to incapacitate the dangerous, outside of a punitive or penal context, to protect others. This kind of forfeiture can be complemented by the other two bases for incapacitation: enforceable duties to self-restrict and lack of accountability. Each type of justification imposes characteristic limits on the way restrictions can operate. Those committed to respecting the dignity of the individual should be pluralists about what can justify targeted liberty restrictions, but we should be principled pluralists, recognizing and respecting the need for justificatory coherence within each type of justification.</jats:p>