Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This book defends Empathic Rationalism, a new account of the relationship between morality and rationality. It seeks to vindicate the idea that we have to care about other people because failing to do so involves treating them as less real than ourselves, and explains this in terms of the indispensable role of empathy in understanding other minds. Traditional approaches to moral philosophy have often treated empathy as contrasting with or even opposed to rationality, but Empathic Rationalism views empathy as an integral part of rationality. This provides a secular, naturalistic foundation for belief in objective morality: to act morally is simply to act rationally, which requires acting as we estimate perfect empathy would tell us to act. Someone who consistently shows no desire to act in this way reveals themselves to be a solipsist in denial: they treat other minds as useful fictions and other people as props in a game of make-believe.</jats:p>